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There’s no hope : The global economic
crisis and the politics of resistance in
Southern Europe1
La crise économique globale et les stratégies de résistance dans le sud de




Although north-central Europe has suddenly developed an acute case of amnesia, a
few years ago the financial press was praising Spain, Portugal and even Greece (plus
non-EU Turkey) for their competence in trimming public spending and boosting
growth rates. In the immediate aftermath of the Wall Street debacle, the fears of
the EU had been principally focused on Ireland, the Baltic and Eastern Europe. The
Mediterranean  as  a  whole  was  perceived  as  relatively  well  protected  from  the
financial tsunami crossing the Atlantic at supersonic speed (Davis, 2011, p. 10).
1 As Mike Davis points out, Southern European countries have been “late comers” in the
process  of  economic  crisis  affecting  the  world  economy  since  2007,  subsequently
becoming the epicentre of the global economic turmoil. In its early stages, the crisis was
concentrated in the US economy, where the subprime mortgage crisis began in 2006-07
giving  rise  to  an  unprecedented  financial  turmoil  in  the  era  of  globalisation  and  a
consequent  wave  of  economic  slump and stagnation across  the  world :  the  so-called
“Second  Great  Contraction”  in  recent  capitalist  history,  after  the  “First  Great
Contraction” or Great Depression as is commonly know that followed the 1929 banking
crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010). 
2 As soon as the crisis “infected” the financial sector, since late 2008 the “epidemic” rapidly
spread to other capitalist regions across the globe, including those European countries
that in previous years had been particularly exposed to processes of financialisation of
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their fast-growing economies : Ireland, Iceland, Greece, Spain and in a minor way also the
Baltic and East-European countries. Since the early 1990s, when global markets were in
the  middle  of  the  impetuous  process  of  geographical  expansion  that  academic
researchers  had  started  to  define  in  terms  of  “globalisation”  (Dicken,  2011),  these
economies have been heavily penetrated by foreign banks and international  capitals,
following  processes  of  market  deregulation  and  liberalization  at  national  and
international  levels.  However,  since  mid-2010,  the  financial  epidemic  has  begun  to
seriously threaten other countries in Southern Europe, such as Portugal, Italy and most
recently France, while countries at Northern latitudes – such as the Baltic countries and
Iceland, but not Ireland which has remained part of the so-called PIIGS circle – have been
more  successful  in  revamping  their  economies,  managing  to  re-enhance  their
competitiveness,  at  least  according to conventional  economic indicators  such as  GDP
growth and foreign direct investment. 
3 In  the  second  phase  of  the  global  recession  (2010-12),  the  epicentre  of  the  global
economic recession has become, therefore, Southern Europe, where the crisis has taken
the form of a sovereign debt crisis : for one indicator or another, Spain, Greece, Italy and
Portugal (and partly also the more solid France) are all countries whose economies are
under the threat of default and collapse and for this reason they are at the centre of
international  debates  about  the  global  economic  crisis.  Along  with  the  problem  of
national indebtedness, which menaces to force them to leave the Eurozone, the advent of
the crisis has exacerbated social problems and economic weaknesses historically affecting
these  countries :  high  unemployment  rates,  female  participation in  the  labour  force
persistently below the EU average, low social mobility, persistent and even deepening
regional  imbalances,  high  mortality  rates  of  firms,  amongst  the  others.  In  these
economically fragile contexts, large cities play an ambivalent role : on the one hand, they
tend to attract the few innovative economic activities in these regions (from capital-
intensive and high-tech firms to research centres and advanced business services) ; on
the other hand, they are also places where social tensions are most evident and where
local  economies  exhibit  their  contradictions :  a  hypertrophic  public  sector  where
relations of clientelism and political patronage are still predominant ; the persistence of
parasitic  industries  surviving  thanks  to  state  subsidies ;  insufficient  infrastructure
endowment ; obsolescence of urban planning policies and regulations. Altogether, these
and other structural problems and distortions frustrate the socio-economic potential of
these regions, preventing the achievement of a socially inclusive development path and
generating  phenomena of  environmental  degradation and citizens’  distrust  in  public
institutions. 
4 The case of  Cagliari  and the ways in which this city has been affected by the global
economic crisis is illustrative of this broader politico-economic context. Before exploring
this case-study, the paper will analyse the distinctive features of neoliberalism in Italy
and in the Southern Italian context. The paper will be structured as follows : in the first
section, we shall scrutinise the distinguishing features of neoliberalism in Italy and the
Italian Mezzogiorno ; in the second section, after having shortly presented a political-
economic profile of Cagliari and the Sardinia region, we shall outline the ways in which
the global economic crisis has manifested in this city in the form of a variety of protest
movements using the urban space as a place of encounter. Finally, in the conclusion the
paper will reflect on the future of neoliberalism and Southern Europe. 
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Neoliberalism at the margins of Europe
5 It is now widely accepted within the critical social sciences to view neoliberalism as a
mobile and hybrid technology of government (see Ong, 2007), constantly travelling across
the globe and, in doing so, fusing with local cultures of governance, entrepreneurship and
socio-economic  agency.  The  mobility,  contingency  and  spatiotemporal  variegation  of
neoliberalism have been widely debated by critical social scientists over the last twenty
years, particularly with reference to urban and regional development pathways (Wilson,
2004 ;  Brenner,  Peck and Theodore,  2010).  In  this  specific  perspective,  scholars  have
placed  emphasis  on  cities  as  sites  where  neoliberalism  as  a  mobile  technology
materialises in more visible ways :  more than any other spatial  setting,  in the era of
globalisation  and  postmodernity  cities  have  acted  simultaneously  as  spaces  of
representation  (as  sites  of  hallmark  events  and iconic  architecture),  government  (as
crucial  scales  of  subnational  governance)  and  contestation  (as  incubators  of  social
movements) for neoliberalism as a mode of regulation and capitalist accumulation (see
Rossi and Vanolo, 2012). 
6 In light of increasingly generalised assumptions about the contingency and variegation of
neoliberalism in time and space, a burgeoning literature dealing with the manifestation
of neoliberalism in an increasing variety of geographical settings has developed in recent
times. While there is panoply of contributions dealing with the emerging economies of
Asia and South-America, it is surprising to notice the paucity of literature investigating
neoliberalism in what was once said to be a major example of “semi-peripheral region” in
the  capitalist  world  economy :  Southern  Europe  (Arrighi,  1985).  This  scarcity  is
particularly evident in the case of Italy and even more in the South of Italy, the so-called
Mezzogiorno, once a highly investigated example of uneven regional development in a
semi-peripheral context. In the light of this state of affairs, a number of questions arise :
is  Italy  a  neoliberal economy ?  And,  if  it  is  so,  what  kind of  neoliberalism does  this
country exemplify ? And what about the Mezzogiorno and the long-standing North-South
divide ? In the next section of this paper, we shall attempt to answer these questions, by
analysing the distinctive features of neoliberalism in Italy and the position occupied by
the Mezzogiorno in the described politico-economic context.
 
Italy : concerted neoliberalism
7 While in the major Anglo-Saxon countries the rise of neoliberalism as dominant mode of
regulation traces back to the early 1980s, in Southern Europe and elsewhere the shift
from Keynesian modes  of  regulation to  specific  forms of  neoliberalism has  occurred
largely in the subsequent decade. 
8 Italy is not an exception to this chronology. It is in the early 1990s that this country
started shifting towards the neoliberal mode of economic governance and regulation. A
decisive turning-point in this evolution of Italy’s economy and politics is represented by
the  political-economic  crisis  of  1992.  In  political  terms,  in  1992  Italy  witnessed  the
opening of a groundbreaking judicial enquiry, denominated Mani Pulite (or Clean Hands),
which began in Milan (Italy’s economic capital) and then spread to other regions. The
inquiry  brought  to  light  the  widespread  corruption  within  the  political  system,
eventually leading to the crisis and decline of the First Republic (the post-war Republic).
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In economic terms, in the same year Italy was hit by what has been known for many years
as the “big crisis” in this country, at least until the global economic crisis of the late
2000s. Italy’s economic slump in 1992 was linked to a broader currency crisis occurring at
the  European level  within  the  framework of  the  then operating  European Monetary
System (later replaced by the Eurozone). Direct effect of the crisis was the devaluation of
the  national  currency,  which forced  Italy  to  withdraw from the  European Monetary
System (along with the UK). The other side of the coin of this unpleasant decision was
that the depreciation of the national currency allowed Italian small and medium-sized
enterprises (Italian manufacturing system is largely composed of small companies, as the
literature on the Third Italy has documented in previous years) to temporarily enhance
their competitive position within the international economy, because Italian products
could  be  sold  at  lower  prices  abroad.  However,  the  monetary  incentive  to  increase
exports was not sufficient to revitalise the Italian economy, which was burdened by an
unsustainable government debt (around 100% of GDP). The economic crisis urged the
Italian government (at that time led by technocrats as the major political parties had
been involved in the judicial enquiry) to approve a budget law containing a series of
austerity  measures  that  were  intended  to  improve  Italy’s  competitiveness  and  fiscal
balance : increase in pension age, removal of the so-called “sliding scale” (or scala mobile) 
linking wage rates to product prices, introduction of fees for health services provided by
hospitals, privatisation of government-owned companies, amongst the others. At the time
of writing (summer 2012), similar measures have been adopted, or are in the process of
being adopted,  by another  technocratic  government  nominated in December 2011 in
order to deal with a comparably difficult economic situation originally caused by the
international financial crash of 2008-09. 
9 Beyond contingent initiatives aimed at short-term economic recovery, the year 1992 thus
represents the point of departure for Italy’s transition towards a neoliberal governance of
the economy. At the institutional level, the neoliberalisation of the Italian economy has
been based on a pact of collaboration between national government, trade unions and the
employers’ organisations. Austerity policies were agreed with the unions through the so-
called  “concertation  process”.  This  consensus-led  approach  to  economic  reform and
restructuring implied that government had to coordinate the decision-making process
with the trade unions, thus avoiding conflict and opposition. However, in several marches
and assemblies organised in response to austerity policies, leaders of the major unions
were severely contested by workers concerned about the pensions reform and the wage
restraint  policy.  Even  in  the  presence  of growing  social  discontent,  the  so-called
“concertation  method”  has  continued  to  lead  the  process  of  economic  reform,
particularly in the labour market, for almost a decade. The unity among trade unions
came to an end only during the Berlusconi government in the first half of the 2000s (the
longest in Republican Italy) when the left-leaning trade union (CGIL) dissociated itself
from labour (de)regulation agreements subscribed by the other two major unions (the
catholic CISL and the social-democratic UIL). 
10 However, despite recent disagreements, trade unions have jointly played a central role in
the transition towards “concerted neoliberalism” in Italy. As a result, from 1992 onwards,
the neoliberalisation of the economy proceeded smoothly in a context of apparent “social
peace”, radically restructuring class relationships and the dynamics of social conflict in
Italy.  In  particular,  two  have  been  the  pillars  of  the  neoliberalisation  of  the  Italian
economy and society : the flexibilisation of the labour force and the deregulation of the
There’s no hope : The global economic crisis and the politics of resistance i...
Belgeo, 1-2 | 2012
4
housing  market.  The  flexibilisation  of  the  labour  force  has  been  pursued  through
subsequent  legislative  acts  approved  by  the  Parliament  accepting  reform  proposals
advanced by both centre-left and centre-right government coalitions between 1995 and
2004  and  most  recently  in  June  2012.  Flexibilisation  soon  turned  out  to  be  a  pure
“precariousisation” of the labour force, as the introduction of temporary contracts has
not  been  accompanied  by  social  security  provisions  and  benefits  for  the  causalised
workers. As a result, since the mid-1990s the precariousness of the workforce – especially
of its younger cohorts – and the related dualism of the labour market have become the
phenomena that  in  many  respects  best  illustrate  the  malaises  and  contradictions  of
Italian society (see Molé, 2010).
11 The second pillar of neoliberalism in Italy has been the housing sector. The supply of
public housing has decreased by about 20% between 1991 and 2007, amounting only to the
4% of the occupied housing stock in 2010 (Nomisma, 2010). In the past, the historically
limited supply of public and subsidised housing in Italy was compensated by legislation
aimed  at  keeping  rental  prices  affordable  for  disadvantaged  groups  in  the  private
property market. The so-called “fair rent” act was approved in 1978 with this purpose.
However,  legislative acts  passed by the Parliament in 1992 and 1998 (the latter by a
centre-left majority) gradually neutralised the “fair rent” policy, rendering it de facto
inoperative in recent years. As a result of this twofold process – the shrinkage of public
housing supply and the neutralisation of regulations making the private rental sector
more affordable – Italy has become a nation with a record number of homeowners : in
2010, two years after the end of the housing bubble of the 2000s, the 84% of households
were owner-occupiers. For many years, the conventional wisdom has portrayed Italian
families  as  tireless  savers  and  far  less  indebted  homeowners  compared  with  their
counterparts in other capitalist countries, as home buyers are accustomed to rely on safe
intra-family  loans  in  Italy.  This  reassuring  picture  of  socially  cohesive  and  almost
universal  homeownership  was  disturbed in  late  2010  by  the  alarming  publication  in
Italian newspapers (see, for instance, La Repubblica, 2010) of the findings contained in a
research  report  by  the  Bank  of  Italy,  which  showed  that  the  so-called  “mortgage
delinquency  rate”  steadily  increased  amongst  mortgaged  Italian  households  between
2000 and 2007 (up to the 5%), thus already before the financial crisis, and that Italians are
ranked at the top of the credit risk list along with Spaniards in Europe. Social groups that
are most exposed to credit risk are those who have lost their jobs after stipulating a
mortgage, but also single parents, low-income workers and the expanding category of
temporary  (“precarious”)  employees  (Banca  d’Italia,  2010).  Job  precariousness  and
unequal access to housing are thus closely interrelated phenomena shedding light on the
contradictions and inequalities that have arisen from the neoliberalisation of the Italian
economy over the last two decades.
12 While the labour market and the housing sector have been subject to a relatively smooth
process  of  deregulation,  privatisation  and  liberalisation  reforms  have  proven  more
problematic. In some cases, these reforms have found the opposition of professional and
elite  power  groups  (those  with  closer  links  with  members  of  Parliament) :  from the
powerful  liberal  professions  (lawyers,  pharmacists,  dentists,  etc.)  to  the  less  affluent
categories  of  independent  contractors  and  retailers  (taxi  drivers,  tobacconists,
newsagents,  etc.).  The  privatisation  of  government-owned  utility  and  infrastructure
companies  has  been  more  straightforward  but  is  still  underway  and  with  contested
outcomes :  between the first half of the 1990s and the early 2000s telephone, energy,
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motorway and railway state-owned operators were privatised, entirely or partly as the
state has remained the majority shareholder in some cases (such as that of  ENI,  the
multinational oil and gas company and Italy’s best positioned firm in annual rankings of
world’s  biggest  companies).  Particularly  contested  has  been  the  privatisation  of  the
motorways  and  train  operating  companies,  as  profit-led  economic  imperatives  have
appeared to prevail  over the public function of these services.  In December 2011 the
railway  operating  company  unilaterally  decided  to  suppress  night-train  routes
historically  connecting  the  Southern  to  the  Northern  regions,  still  widely  used  by
domestic migrants and long-distance commuters for their affordable fares. At the same
time, investments in motorways and other infrastructure in the South have remained
weak  and  inadequate,  while  spectacular  infrastructure  projects  (whose  social  utility,
however, has always been unclear) such as the bridge that should link Sicily to mainland
Italy across the Strait of Messina are repeatedly announced but never commenced. This
occurs also because EU’s financial support to infrastructure projects has effects at intra-
regional and in fewer cases inter-regional levels but not at a national level as they are
confined to the less-favoured regions in the South. 
13 In  conclusion,  the  retreat  of  the  state  and  the  related  wave  of  privatisations  have
deepened the infrastructure marginalisation of the Southern regions in Italy. This leads
us  to  zoom  our  analytical  focus  on  the  Mezzogiorno  and  the  North-South  divide
historically characterising Italy’s economic geography.
 
The supposed end of the Southern Question
14 The material disconnection of the South from the North of Italy (the increased socio-
spatial  selectiveness  of  inter-regional  transportation  services  and  the  widening
infrastructure gap) has special significance. As in all economically “backward” regions,
infrastructure endowment has historically been a key issue in debates about regional
inequalities and related policy initiatives. When post-war Italy started a regional policy
denominated  “Extraordinary  Intervention”,  which  drew  inspiration  from  Roosevelt’s
“New Deal” in the USA, infrastructure policies were placed high on the agenda during the
so-called “pre-industrialisation phase”. Extraordinary Intervention indeed started in the
1950s focusing on public works in agriculture (land reclamation, irrigation systems, etc.)
and the transportation sector (construction of motorways, railways, etc.). In subsequent
decades,  Extraordinary  Intervention  started  grappling  with  the  production  sectors
themselves, such as the industry most notably, even though specialists of the “Southern
Question” agree that the early “infrastructural stage” of the programme was the most
successful and effective in terms of support to economic development pathways at the
regional  level  (see  Rossi,  2002).  Between  the  mid-1980s  and  the  early  1990s,  Italian
governments put an end to the Extraordinary Intervention, terminating the Cassa per il
Mezzogiorno (or Fund for the Mezzogiorno) that had been established in 1950 in order to
cope with the implementation of this policy. The ending years of the Programme had
been particularly characterised by the clientelistic management of public expenditure,
such as in the case of the programme supporting the physical reconstruction of the areas
hit  by  the  earthquake  in  the  Campania  region.  In  1992,  a  turning-point  also  in  this
respect, the Agenzia per il Mezzogiorno – as the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno had been renamed in
1984  –  was  dismantled.  After  about  thirty  years  of  intervention,  a  mixed picture  of
successes and failures took shape : on the one hand, the Mezzogiorno appeared to have
undergone  an  unprecedented  process  of  transformation,  especially  in  terms  of
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infrastructure  endowment ;  on  the  other  hand,  however,  the  state-led  intervention
programme ended up fostering phenomena of  clientelism and corruption.  In the last
instance, this degeneration delegitimised the role of state expenditure in tackling the
North-South divide, offering the opportunity for starting a process of neoliberalisation as
the previous section has showed (see Martinelli, 2009).
15 After the unraveling of the Keynesian policy of Extraordinary Intervention, in the second
half of the 1990s the South of Italy found itself in the middle of a difficult economic
transition. In 1996, the centre-left government launched a new policy initiative named
“Negotiated  Planning”  (Gualini,  2001),  which  aimed  at  sustaining  processes  of  local
economic development in the southern regions based on forms of collaborative planning
and negotiated decision-making at the institutional level and on the revitalisation of local
economies and particularly of embryonic industrial districts reproducing forms of local
economic development associated with the so-called Third Italy model : policy initiatives
called “Territorial Pacts” are an example of this regional development policy that lasted
until the early 2000s. 
16 The  success  of  this  neo-institutionalist  and  post-Fordist  approach  to  the  economic
development of the Mezzogiorno has been limited in terms of wealth and employment
locally generated (Rossi, 2004). The perceived failure of the new programme of regional
policy based on the stimulation of  endogenous growth has generated a new wave of
disillusionment towards policies specifically addressing the economy of the Mezzogiorno
understood  as  a  unitary  politico-geographical  entity.  This  has  led  influential
commentators to make pleas to “abolish the Mezzogiorno” (Viesti, 2003) and to call for a
broader vision putting the Mezzogiorno in the Mediterranean context by paying renewed
attention in terms of policy strategies to infrastructure and particularly to the logistics
sector (N. Rossi, 2005). While the Southern Question became delegitimised owing to its
own – perceived or real  – failures,  the same decades (the 1990s and the 2000s) have
witnessed the rapid political ascent of the Lega Nord in the most prosperous parts of the
country, fostering explicitly anti-Southern sentiments and calling for politico-economic
devolution if  not  secession from the national  state.  Even though regional  disparities
between the North and the South of the country were persistent and in some respects
even widened during these decades, the alleged Northern Question – with representatives
of  small  and  medium-sized  businesses  in  the  forefront  of  the  devolutionist  political
movement – has gained increasingly wide currency within the general public. 
17 While the discontent of the most affluent regions of the country came to the fore in
public debate in the 1990s and the subsequent decade, the deprived regions of the South
were confined to debates focusing on technical issues falling within the post-political
realm of the European multi-level governance system. In conclusion, the transition to
neoliberalism in Italy has implied a simultaneously geographical and politico-economic
shift of attention from the less favoured to the most prosperous regions of the country.
The  neoliberal  paradox  characterising  Italy  in  the  last  two  decades  has  therefore
produced a reversed map of policy priorities and concerns compared with the Keynesian
times of the post-war decades.
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An island in the storm : the global economic crisis in
Cagliari and the Sardinia region
18 Over the last two or three years, the Sardinia Region has attracted growing attention of
Italy’s general public in the news concerning the effects of the global economic crisis.
Since  2010,  Cagliari  –  as  the  regional  capital  of  Sardinia  –  has  witnessed  a  growing
outburst of social discontent, taking the form of frequent street demonstrations led by a
variety of social groups : industrial workers threatened with losing their jobs ; shepherds
and independent farmers affected by the deepening of the already ongoing agricultural
crisis ; small entrepreneurs and independent contractors struggling to survive, amongst
the others (see below in this  paragraph a more detailed description of  these protest
movements). In their demonstrations, many of these protest movements have attempted
to stage occupations of local government’s headquarters and key public spaces in Cagliari.
For a region that in the last years built its reputation as a “tourist paradise”, it has been
doubly inconvenient to associate its image with one of crisis, socio-economic suffering
and mass protest. 
19 Sardinia’s  situation  is  not  exceptional  in  the  Italian  and  the  larger  South-European
contexts, as we have seen in the previous paragraphs of this paper. However, while other
regions in the South of Italy have also seriously suffered the consequences of the crisis,
the Sardinia region seems to have been especially affected by the global economic slump.
This situation appears to be in contrast to conventional economic indicators, such as the
GDP above all,  which place Sardinia at  a slightly higher position in terms of  growth
performances with respect to the other regions historically forming the Mezzogiorno.
Indeed,  in the current round of EU regional  policy (2007-13) Sardinia has gained the
status as phasing-in region, while the other Southern regions are either phasing-out or
convergence regions, which means that their GDP is ranked at a lower position than the
average of the enlarged EU. In particular, recent data show that the poorest regions in the
South are Sicily, Campania and Calabria, the former two being also the most populous
regions in the South. 
20 It is beyond the scope of this paper examining the causes of these regionally uneven
“catch  up”  processes  in  the  South  of  Italy,  to  put  it  in  the  conventional  lexicon of
development  studies.  However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  three  worst-performing
regions in the Mezzogiorno are those whose economies and societies have been most
heavily affected by the presence of organised crime : the Mafia in Sicily, the “Ndrangheta
in Calabria and the Camorra in Campania. From this point of view, Sardinia has been
historically characterised by the absence of significant criminal gangs organized on a
permanent basis, apart from the phenomenon of kidnapping that was widespread in the
mountain areas of the region still in the 1980s but has disappeared in recent times. The
lack  of  crime  and  the  relatively  low  demographic  pressure  (compared  to  densely
populated regions such as  Sicily,  Campania and Puglia,  Campania having the highest
fertility rates at the national level) has allowed Sardinia to retain a slightly wealthier
condition in the Italian South. 
21 At the same time, Sardinia’s peripheral and isolated location has produced a common
sense and related geographical imaginary of wilderness particularly associated with its
unspoilt  inland areas (see Heatherington,  2010),  but  also defining the identity of  the
region as a whole. As a result, being conventionally known for the structural weaknesses
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deriving  from  its  insularity  (particularly  in  terms  of  transport  connections  to  the
mainland  as  well  as  of  limited  energy  supply),  today’s  Sardinia  is  also  customarily
regarded in a more positive light as a mostly uncontaminated region. An increasingly
commonly  held  view indeed  maintains  that  this  peripheral  positionality  entails  the
potential to turn Sardinia into an emblem of environmentally sensitive region on a large
scale. Even so, apart from the flourishing but persistently seasonal tourist sector, whose
environmental sustainability however is dubious at least (being concentrated along the
coast),  the economy of the island still  draws a great part of its subsistence from the
conventional (highly polluting) industrial sector such as refineries and chemical plants
located both in the North and the South of the island.
22 In this context, due also to its own peripherality at the regional level, being located in the
far South of the island, Cagliari has historically played the role as a merely administrative
centre  within  the  framework  of  the  top-down,  hierarchical  structure  of  regional
government.  In  the  post-war  decades,  Cagliari  and  its  larger  urban  conglomeration
coinciding with the province’s tier level of government was also targeted by the policy of
growth poles enacted within the framework of the previously mentioned Extraordinary
Intervention  programme  (see  Rossi,  2009).  Located  in  the  Westsouthern  part  of  the
region,  the  growth-pole  of  Portovesme,  which  specialises  in  metalworking  processes
(especially  aluminium),  is  still  active,  even  though  it  has  become  one  of  the  most
problematic areas in the region well before the 2008-09 global crisis. In January 2012,
Alcoa – the third world’s leading firm in the aluminium industry, with headquarters in
Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania), employing around one thousand workers in Portovesme – has
announced the closure of its Sardinian plant, along with those in Spain (see more below). 
23 Located even closer to Cagliari (only 25 km from the city centre) is another industrial
giant :  the oil  refinery of  Sarroch founded in 1962 by Milanese entrepreneur Angelo
Moratti  and still  owned by his  heirs,  currently  employing 1800  workers  (the  largest
employer in the private sector in the region). While this industry enjoys relatively good
health  in  terms  of  profits  and  market  shares,  its  location  is  highly  problematic  in
environmental  terms,  as  its  carbon  emissions  affect  the  environment  of  a  diffusely
populated area (the Southwestern part of Cagliari’s urban region) close to the renowned
tourist destinations of Pula and Chia. 
24 While there is widespread conviction that the mature, externally owned industrial sector
is bound to disappear and relocate elsewhere sooner or later, greater expectations have
been formed with regard to local economic development in recent times. The Mid North
of Sardinia has seen the rise of a still limited number of endogenous industrial districts,
such as the natural cork district in Calangianus (near Olbia) and the textile district of
Macomer, the latter however being heavily affected by the crisis of this sector since 2005.
Southern Sardinia (where Cagliari is located), on its part, lacks industrial districts and
other forms of locally embedded manufacturing systems. The weakness of local industry
has also prevented the South of the island from seizing the opportunity to become a
logistic hub in connection with the development of the maritime economy, following the
foundation of the Cagliari International Container Terminal in the late 1990s. Originally
presented as an ambitious project potentially transforming Cagliari into a “gateway city”
in the Western Mediterranean (see Short et al., 2000), having experienced a number of
vicissitudes in the pre-crisis period,  the Cagliari port container has remained a mere
transshipment  hub  failing  to  territorialise  itself  by  establishing  trade-production
connections with the local economy (Boggio, Memoli and Rossi, 2008)2. 
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25 On the other hand, however, in recent years the urban area of Cagliari has seen the rise of
two  post-Fordist  industries :  the  internationally  renowned  telephone  and  internet
services  provider  Tiscali,  formed  in  1998  and  owned  in  majority  by  Renato  Soru,  a
charismatic entrepreneur who was subsequently elected head of a centre-left regional
government in 2004 (holding this position until 2008) ; and since its foundation in 1990
the publicly funded science and technology park, called Sardegna Ricerche, specialising in
applied research covering the fields of biomedicine, energy and the environment and
information society. Taken together, the ICT industry and the science and technology
park currently have around 1000 employees, even though in recent years the former has
faced  a  process  of  restructuring  as  a  consequence  of  reduced  business  activity  and
financial stability. In the 2000s, the regional government has invested a large amount of
European funds in initiatives aimed at enhancing the Research and Development sector in
Sardinia, some of them have been widely regarded as innovative, being also imitated by
other regional  governments in Italy,  such as the “Master and back” policy by which
Sardinian students had the opportunity to attend postgraduate studies outside the island
and then to come back for an internship period. 
26 It  is  against  the backdrop of  this  socio-economic context,  which is  due to Sardinia’s
insularity  but  is  also  exemplificative  of  uneven  regional  development  patterns  and
dynamics in Southern Europe, that one has to understand the manifestation of the global
economic crisis in the city of Cagliari and in the island as a whole. The examples reported
above show that crucial sectors of the Sardinian economy have been affected by processes
of crisis and decline already in the mid-2000s, thus before the manifestation of the global
economic crisis. The agricultural crisis particularly affecting shepherds and independent
farmers, the decline of the textile district in Macomer, the shrinkage of the ICT business
in Cagliari and the closure of plants in the growth pole in Portovesme : all these events
date back to the pre-crisis years. The majority of the “qualified informants”3 that have
been  interviewed  for  this  research  project  have  underlined  the  preexisting  crisis
condition in Sardinia. At the same time, they have also noted how “The Crisis” – the
global economic crisis – has arrived late in Sardinia compared with regions in Europe that
are more centrally positioned in both geographical and economic terms. This delayed
manifestation of the crisis is  not specific to Sardinia,  but it  has to do with Southern
Europe  as  a  whole,  which initially  appeared to  be  only  peripherally  touched by  the
economic  downturn  of  2008-09  hitting  the  more  financialised  economies  of  North
America and North-Central Europe (cf. Mike Davis’s quotation in the introduction to this
paper). 
27 Having provided a picture of  the regional  and urban economic context in which the
global crisis has intervened, the coming sections of this paragraph will present the social
protest arising from the crisis that has taken shape in Cagliari in recent times. 
 
The crisis, the city, and the politics of encounter
28 Since 2010 the city of Cagliari has played a central role in the crisis as a place of gathering
for a variety of local protest movements organised by social groups particularly affected
by the crisis. Two aspects deserve attention with respect to these protest movements :
first, most of the social groups that have given rise to these movements are not physically
located  in  Cagliari,  even  though  they  have  chosen  this  city  as  a  place  for  their
demonstrations ; second, the majority of these movements were already in the process of
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formation before the crisis but then have been erupting as soon as the crisis has taken
shape. The crisis, therefore, becomes a catalyst for social discontent, while the city allows
protest to happen. 
29 The first aspect – which can be defined as the urbanisation of protest movements (in
Cagliari) originating from elsewhere (other areas of Sardinia) – is illustrative of what
Andy Merrifield (2011) has recently argued in his reflection on the legacy of the political
struggles and insurgent movements that erupted across the world in 2011 : from the Arab
Spring in North Africa and the Middle East, to the Occupy Wall Street campaign in North
America and the movement of Indignados in Spain. In his article, Merrifield points out that
– despite the apparent de-materialisation of collective mobilisation and the emphasis
commonly laid on immaterial  networks of  communication (Facebook,  Twitter,  etc.)  –
these  struggles  show  how  the  city  remains  a  crucial  site  of  political  action  in  the
contemporary  world,  even  beyond  the  claiming  of  the  right-to-the-city  itself.  Put  it
differently, these mobilisations prove that the city is a common space where “here comes
everybody”  producing  an  encounter  capable  of  reconciling  a  variety  of  senses  of
belonging and identity with the universalism of claims and social  needs.  It  is  in this
perspective that local protest movements in Cagliari can be understood. In particular, five
protest movements have erupted since “the crisis” started in 2010 :  I)  shepherds and
independent  farmers ;  II)  retailers  and  contractors ;  III)  truck  drivers ;  IV)  industrial
workers ; V) civil-society organisations. 
 
Shepherds and farmers : losers of the “single market”
30 The movement of independent farmers traces its origins back to the 1990s, when the
Italian Parliament approved a law implementing a European Union’s directive by which
nearly  five  thousand Sardinia  agricultural  firms  had illegitimately  received subsidies
from the regional government (judged as “state aids” distorting market competition) and
thus  had  to  give  the  money  back  to  the  state.  After  prolonged  struggles  and
confrontation, in October 2011 the regional government announced that the payment of
these debts was temporarily suspended following an agreement with the EU institutions.
However,  while  the crisis  linked to the indebtement has been partially  resolved,  the
effects of the global economic crisis have hit the agricultural sector in Sardinia : in 2011
and 2012 there has been an increase in agricultural firms being forced to close. 
31 While  the  regional  scene  has  been occupied for  many years  by  the  struggles  of  the
indebted farmers, recent years have seen an intensification of protest led by shepherds as
a consequence of the “structural crisis” affecting the agricultural sector . The movement
of shepherds in Sardinia has developed under the banner of the Movimento Pastori Sardi
(Movement of Sardinian Shepherds), a regional organisation independent from national
unions in this sector (accused of being insensitive to local and regional needs), whose
origins also date back to the 1990s. Sardinian shepherds lament the unfavourable market
conditions  affecting  small-sized  diary  farms  (in  particular,  the  high  price  of  locally
produced sheep milk, Sardinia being Italy’s major producer of Pecorino Romano along
with other local varieties of sheep cheese). Since late 2010 this movement has given rise
to  a  heated  protest  culminating  in  repeated  street  riots,  the  most  violent  of  which
occurred  in  Cagliari  in  October  2010,  when  the  shepherds  tried  to  occupy  the
headquarters of the Regional Council (the elective legislative body of a Region in Italy). At
the end of December 2011, the regional government announced that European funds in
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support to Sardinian agriculture had been increased up to 160 million euro, doubling
those received only two years earlier. This inflow of money has been intended also to
calm protests,  even though at  the  time of  writing  (summer 2012)  it  is  still  early  to
evaluate  its  effect.  The crisis  of  agriculture  –  a  sector  having great  potential  in  the
Sardinia region – is also closely related to the broader food crisis at the global level,
which is one of the factors behind the recent wave of rebellions and revolutions in North
Africa and elsewhere across the world (Holt-Giménez and Patel, 2009).
 
Retailers and artisans : victims of privatisation
32 The movement of small retailers and artisans has developed under the banner of the
independent Movimento Artigiani  e  Commercianti  Liberi  Sardegna which has taken shape
since 2011 in the region of Sulcis-Iglesiente, the area in Southwestern Sardinia that has
most suffered the consequences of the crisis. The movement formed in response to the
imposition of onerous fiscal penalties associated with tax evasion. For many years, small
fiscal infractions were tolerated in Italy, especially in the deprived South, but after the
privatisation  of  tax  collection  they  have  been  severely  sanctioned.  For  its  allegedly
persecutory methods (insolvent taxpayers not paying the fines are threatened with legal
sanctions eventually leading to property foreclosure), the privatised agency Equitalia has
become a usual target of social discontent in Sardinia and elsewhere in Italy.
33 The  anti-penalties  movement  has  gained visibility  following  a  mass  demonstration
organised in Cagliari  in late July 2011,  jointly with the movement of shepherds.  This
unusual alliance was joined by the truck drivers in January 2012 within the framework of
the so-called Movimento dei  Forconi Sardi (Sardinia Pitchfork Movement),  which will be
analysed in the subsequent section.
 
Truck drivers : the moving protestors
34 The movement of truck drivers has taken shape for the first time in July 2011 under the
aegis of the newly formed Sardegna in Movimento (Sardinia in Movement) association. At
the time, truck drivers occupied the harbour of Olbia in the North-East of the island (the
busiest  port  in Sardinia for passengers and goods connecting the island to mainland
Italy), protesting against the rise in transportation costs imposed by private maritime
companies operating under conditions of de facto monopoly. 
35 However, it has been in January 2012 that the truck drivers movement has attracted the
attention of the wider public in Italy, when it gave rise to the Sardinian version of the so-
called Movement of Pitchforks that took originally form in Sicily, leading to the blockade
of  Italian  motorways  for  an  entire  week  with  severe  repercussions  on  the  national
economy. In Sicily,  truck drivers started protesting against the increase in fuel price,
receiving  solidarity  and  support  from  college  students  and  other  spontaneously
organised  groups  fed  up  with  the  corruption  of  politicians,  but  also  accusations  of
populism and coercive methods of protest. The Sardinia Pitchfork Movement organised
the simultaneous occupation of two key sites of the port of Cagliari : the artisans and
retailers were protagonists of the occupation of Molo Ichnusa, the newly built cruise ship
terminal in the historical harbour of Cagliari located just in front of the headquarters of
the Regional Council (a frequent target of protest movements in Sardinia : see section I. in
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this paragraph), while the truck drivers took the lead in the occupation of the commercial
and industrial port in Macchiareddu, in the Eastern part of the bay of Cagliari.
 
Industrial workers : remnants of the growth-pole era
36 In Italy, Sardinian workers employed by Alcoa, a US multi-site company specialised in the
production of aluminium, started to become a symbol of struggles against the crisis when
their demonstration in Rome was severely repressed by the police in November 2009. At
the time, fearing the same fate as Eurallumina, the Russian company specialising in the
production of bauxite and aluminium that closed its plant in Portovesme in March 2009,
Sardinian workers took to the street to protest against the risk of closure for Alcoa’s
Sardinian plant. 
37 About only one year later, in early January 2012 the closure has materialised : Alcoa’s
executive office in Pittsburgh publicly announced the permanent closure of its plants in
Sardinia and in Spain caused by the rising cost of raw materials accompanied by the
falling prices of final goods in the aluminium sector as well as by the rising operating cost
(particularly  the  electric  energy whose  price  is  higher  in  Italy  compared with other
countries). Following this decision, Alcoa workers have taken to the streets again, joining
the  other  protest  groups  and  giving  rise  to  an  unusual  coalition  (the  previously
mentioned Sardinian version of Pitchfork Movement) which brings together social actors
that  until  the recent  past  preceding the advent  of  the crisis  it  was hard to imagine
standing together. Finally, in August 2012 – amid peak tourist season – Alcoa workers
have occupied the roads leading to the airport of Cagliari, forcing tourists to get to the
departure terminal on foot.
 
Post-industrial future denied : the Geomineral Park at risk of closure
38 Following previous UNESCO recognition in the late 1990s, the Geomineral, Historical and
Environmental Park of Sardinia officially started operating in 2001. As a recognition of its
outstanding  mineral  heritage,  the  Sulcis-Iglesiente  region  in  Southwestern  Sardinia
comprises almost half of the Park’s surface area : the mining industry has been still active
in this region until the 1960s and up to the 1940s it was the second largest industry in
Italy following FIAT’s automotive industry (eighteen thousand employees in the Carbonia
area in the 1940s). While industrial companies in this region – those in the Portovesme
pole – are threatened by the effects of the crisis and some of them have already closed
such as Alcoa, local population expected that the establishment of the national Park could
open the way for the transition to a post-industrial  future which however has never
taken shape. In fact, after ten years since its founding, the National Park runs the risk of
closure.  Alarms  about  the  Park’s  closure  started  in  the  Summer  of  2011,  eventually
leading  employees  of  the Park  along  with  nonprofit  organisations  to  stage
demonstrations  and  permanent  sit-ins  at  the  headquarters  of  the  Presidency  of  the
Regional  Government  in  Cagliari.  In  January  2012,  Park  employees  have  expressed
solidarity with Alcoa workers and other groups involved in street protests across the
region.
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Conclusion
39 Cagliari and the Sardinia region are illustrative of the way in which the global economic
crisis has affected the “real” economies of peripheral regions in Southern Europe, hitting
the whole spectrum of economic sectors : from the residual large scale industries to small
firms  in  agriculture,  retail  and  transportation  and  even  the  most  promising
environmentalist and post-Fordist economies. Since 2010 the structural crisis of Southern
Europe has increasingly attracted the attention of the general public and political leaders
in Europe and across the world, after the explosion of the sovereign debt crisis in Greece
and, to a lesser extent, in Portugal, Spain and Italy. While mainstream opinion-makers
have associated the crisis with the undisciplined public spending of the previous years,
critical commentators have pointed to the distorted development pattern prevailing in
Southern  Europe  based  on  a  perverse  combination  of  construction-led  growth,
inadequate investment in technological innovation and unlimited flexibilisation of the
workforce in the absence of both social guarantees and job mobility. 
40 The case of  Cagliari  and the Sardinia region thus provides empirical  evidence of  the
contradictions  arising  from  the  neoliberalisation  of  peripheral  Southern  European
economies,  which have led to  the  eruption of  social  discontent  as  a  reaction to  the
apparent lack of credible economic-political alternatives. In this context, promises of an
environmentally sustainable development for the Southern regions of Europe turn out to
be mere consolations and rhetorical expedients supporting the views of those looking at
the future of Southern Europe as a merely leisure-oriented society. Recently, in the Wall
Street Journal conservative historian Niall Ferguson has forecasted that in ten years’ time
Southern European countries will  become a “vacation land” for industrious Northern
Europeans looking for rest and sunbath (see figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. The New Europe according to Niall Ferguson.
Source : The Wall Street Journal (November 2011).
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41 For this reason, the story of Sardinia tells us about the future of Southern Europe as a
whole. In previous decades, this region embarked on a variety of development pathways,
each one reflecting the “spirit  of  the times” in the conventional  wisdom of  regional
economic planning and policy : the growth pole strategy in the 1960s and the early 1970s,
the discovery of  the “tourism opportunity” in the 1980s,  the rise of  the post-Fordist
industry  (endogenous  districts  and  technological  firms)  and  the  environmentalist
economy in the 1990s and in the last decade.  However,  following in the wake of the
repeated failure of conventional recipes for economic growth, the global economic crisis
is  shattering  the  remaining  expectations  of  economic  prosperity,  while  the  harshest
austerity  measures  are  being  implemented  on  the  grounds  that  there’s  no  hope  for
recovery if national governments and local administrations do not obey the dictates of
international  financial  institutions  and  monetary  authorities.  In  this  context,  even
though  in  Southern  Europe  there  are  still  social  groups  that  react  to  this  situation
resorting to collective action and inter-group solidarity, as this paper has shown, the vast
majority  of  the  population  become  increasingly  discouraged  and  unhopeful  for  the
future, choosing either to emigrate or to rely on clientelistic networks and social class
privilege. In this context, a politics of resistance does not suffice for Southern European
societies to get out of this iron cage of financial neo-colonialism, on the one hand, and of
social  resignation  and  opportunism,  on  the  other  hand.  An  imaginative  politics  of
renaissance is needed at a cross-South-European scale. The point of departure for this
politics of renaissance will have to deal not only with the failures of neoliberalism as a
politico-economic doctrine but also with the possibility to embrace a radically reformed
European project  in search of  a  renewed sense of  socio-spatial  justice  and solidarity
amongst unevenly developed regions (cf. Hadjmichalis, 2011). 
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NOTES
1. This article is part of an ongoing research funded by the Leverhulme Trust (grant number
F10/1010 A) under the title “Towards a postneoliberal urban deal” with colleagues Sara Gonzalez
(principal  investigator,  University  of  Leeds),  Martin  Jones  (Aberystwyth  University),  Stijn
Oosterlynck (University of Antwerp) and Ramon Ribera Fumaz (Universitat Oberta de Catalunya).
2. In  2008  the  Danish  Maersk,  a  leading  liner shipping  in  the  container  sector,  decided  to
terminate the contract with Cagliari as its regional hub, being replaced by the German Hapag
Lloyd about one year later. Transshipment ports, such as Cagliari, Taranto and Gioia Tauro in the
Italian Mezzogiorno, are particularly exposed to the risks associated with the changing locational
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choices of global shipping companies operating under conditions of de facto monopoly. At the
end of 2011 the port of Gioia Tauro – until then the busiest container port in Italy and second in
the Mediterranean – has experienced vicissitudes similar to those described with reference to
Cagliari. 
3. In June 2011 about 12 interviews were conducted with qualified informants. These included :
the President of the local branch of Confindustria (the Italian association of industrialists) ; the
chairman  of  the  local  branch  of  CGIL,  the  left-leaning  major  trade  union  in  Italy ;  the
representative  of  the  association  of  small  retailers ;  an  urban  planner  and  an  independent
economic analyst acting as consultants for local government institutions ; two academics - one
economist and one sociologist – specialising in economic development and labour market issues,
respectively ;  the  head  of  the  committee  supervising  government  expenditure  within  the
regional government ;  a representative of a local  bank ;  the director of Cagliari  International
Container Terminal ; the President of Cagliari Port Authority. 
ABSTRACTS
Since 2010 Southern Europe has become the epicentre of the second phase of the global economic
crisis that began two years earlier as a consequence of the bursting of the mortgage and financial
bubble in the United States. In critical commentaries, this crisis has been understood as a crisis of
neoliberalism as a mode of economic-political regulation. In the first part, this paper analyses the
transition  to  a  neoliberal  mode  of  economic  governance  in  Italy,  understood  in  terms  of
“concerted neoliberalism”, particularly looking at its implications for the North-South divide. In
the second part, the paper looks at the effects of the global crisis in the Sardinia region, through
the lens of the politics of resistance that has taken shape in this context. The paper concludes by
reflecting on the limits to a regionalised politics of resistance, calling for an imaginative politics
of renaissance at a cross-Southern European scale.
Depuis  2010  l’Europe  méridionale  est  devenue  l’épicentre  de  la  seconde  phase  de  la  crise
économique mondiale apparue deux ans plus tôt après l’éclatement de la bulle hypothécaire et
financière aux Etats-Unis. Cette crise a été interprétée comme une crise du néolibéralisme en
tant que mode de régulation économico-politique. Dans un premier temps, cet article analyse la
transition vers un mode néolibéral de gouvernance économique en Italie, compris en termes de
“néolibéralisme concerté”, et plus particulièrement ses conséquences pour la division Nord-Sud.
La seconde partie de l’article est consacrée aux effets de la crise mondiale en Sardaigne, vue à
travers le prisme des stratégies de résistance mises en place dans ce contexte. L’article se conclut
par une réflexion sur les limites d’une stratégie de résistance à l’échelle régionale, appelant à une
politique de renaissance créative au niveau inter-méridional européen.
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